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WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT
HEALTH INSURANCE CHOICE?
Lessons for health care reform
EDITOR’S NOTE
In February 2020, Penn’s Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics (LDI) held a conference, Medicare
for All and Beyond: Expanding Coverage, Containing Costs, which included a panel discussion on the value
of giving consumers a choice of health insurers.1 At that time, “choice” was a rallying cry for proponents and
opponents of various health care reform proposals. Since then, COVID-19 has shifted many people’s health
care priorities. While the full impact of the pandemic remains to be seen, the nation will inevitably return to
important policy debates around health care reform. The role of consumer choice in health insurance will
be central to those debates.

INTRODUCTION
From choosing a doctor to selecting an insurance plan, choices
pervade nearly all aspects of our health care system. However,
there is little agreement among policymakers and the public about
what constitutes “choice,” which choices are important, and how
and whether patients should be asked to make various health care
choices.2 Although Americans claim to value having health insurance
choices, research shows that when presented with options, people
do not actually like to choose. Other studies suggest that people
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frequently make health insurance decisions that leave them worse off,
or not much better than before.
At Penn LDI’s Medicare for All and Beyond conference, a panel of
researchers and policy experts discussed the current evidence around
health insurance choice and implications for future health care reform
efforts.1 This brief summarizes the panel’s key takeaways.
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THE ROLE OF HEALTH INSURANCE
CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE REFORM
“Choice” has featured prominently in the recent health care reform
debate about insurance coverage. Opponents to a single-payer plan,
such as Medicare for All, argue that it would limit Americans’ ability
to select their coverage and care.3 However, supporters contend
that while single-payer would eliminate choice of health plan, it may
expand choice of provider. Since most providers would be in the same
government-run plan, consumers would have a larger selection of
doctors, hospitals, and other providers than under our current multipayer system. Others advocate for a more incremental approach to
insurance expansion. For instance, a “public option” such as Medicaid
buy-in or Medicare Extra for All, would increase health insurance
choice because all individuals would become eligible to enroll in public
insurance.5, 6 Similarly, proposals to lower the Medicare eligibility age
would expand health insurance choice by allowing individuals to enroll
in public coverage earlier in life. Unlike a single-payer plan that would
eliminate private insurance, under a public option, people would still
have the choice to enroll in a private plan.7
The role of choice in health insurance is not new. According to
Hoffman (2020), the issue of choice in health policy can be traced
back decades, at least to the reproductive rights and disability rights
movement.8 Health insurance choice first appeared on the health
policy main stage during the Nixon health reform proposal of 1974,
and again in the Clinton health reform proposal of 1993. The Clinton
proposal, which emphasized plan competition, required that every
consumer be offered a choice of at least three different plans in their
region.9, 10 Hoffman notes that the idea of “choice” quickly became
ingrained in public programs administered by private insurers, such
as Medicare Part D prescription coverage, Medicare Advantage,

“Choice” has featured prominently in the
recent health care reform debate about
insurance coverage. Opponents to a
single-payer plan, such as Medicare for
All, argue that it would limit Americans’
ability to select their coverage and care.

and Medicaid managed care.8 Health insurance choice was also
a cornerstone of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which created
individual and small group marketplaces to expand coverage and
put consumers “back in charge” of their care.11, 12 The marketplaces,
along with pre-existing condition protections, community rating and
guaranteed issue requirements, and Medicaid expansion, gave millions
of individuals new options for coverage.13
As policymakers and the public contemplate the next era of reform,
it is important to re-examine the implicit assumptions surrounding
health insurance choice, and the current evidence on how that choice
actually plays out in practice.

CHOOSING TO NOT CHOOSE
Americans say they value choice, but evidence suggests that people
do not actually like to choose. In the context of health insurance,
consumers who can switch health plans rarely do, often foregoing
hundreds of dollars in savings.14, 15 This is true for employees choosing
employer-sponsored health insurance, Medicare beneficiaries
choosing a prescription drug plan, Medicaid enrollees choosing a
managed care plan, and people choosing individual coverage on the
health insurance marketplaces. How can we understand this paradox
of choosing to not choose?
Some people may want to avoid the hassle associated with choosing
or switching plans. Changing plans can generate substantial “switching
costs,” in terms of time, effort, and psychological stress.16 Similarly,
people tend to stick to their current state of affairs (i.e., status quo
bias) and overestimate potential losses while underestimating
potential gains (i.e., loss aversion). Consumers are also less likely to
make active choices when they are faced with too many options or
complex information. This choice overload can interact with status
quo bias, leading many people to end up with the default plan when
enrolling in or renewing their coverage.17-19

CHOOSING UNWISELY
Even if people can overcome these barriers, exercising choice does
not always deliver much value. A large body of research shows that
we frequently make decisions that leave us worse off, or not much
better than before.17, 20 Underlying the value of choice is the economic
behavioral assumption that consumers will make choices based on
well-ordered preferences, and that these preferences determine
our willingness to pay. Why, then, do we make suboptimal health
insurance choices?
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First, information about the value of different health plans may not
be readily observable to consumers, making it difficult to choose the
optimal plan.21 Second, our preferences for intangible goods (such as
health care services that we have never experienced) are not always
clear or well-ordered.8
Lastly, many people do not have the necessary financial literacy to
evaluate their health care options, and lack a basic understanding
of health plan characteristics. In one study, most people expressed
confidence in their ability to comprehend their health insurance, but
only 14 percent could correctly identify the four main components
of a health plan (copay, coinsurance, deductible, and out-of-pocket
maximum).22 Even people with above-average financial literacy skills
struggle to choose among health plans, selecting the most costeffective plan on a simulated health insurance marketplace only half of
the time.23

INFLUENCING CHOICE
Studies show that our views can be influenced. In a recent experiment,
James Fishkin and colleagues found that even Americans’ “staunchly
held” political beliefs can be changed in a matter of days. Bringing
together over 500 registered voters, Fishkin found that many
participants’ views on health care reform changed significantly after
a weekend of dialogue and deliberation. For instance, Republicans’
support for ACA repeal declined from 70 to 48 percent, while
Democrats’ support for Medicare for All decreased from 70 percent
to 46 percent.24
While these high-level views of health care reform can be changed,
evidence suggests more limited success in improving people’s choices
on health insurance marketplaces to maximize personal value. Some
consumer choices can be influenced by changing choice architecture
(i.e., how we frame information) or subtle nudges (i.e., behavioral
prompts). The ACA tried techniques such as plan standardization,
grouping plans by metal level, and decision-support tools to help
marketplace enrollees make more optimal plan selections.19 However,
in some instances, metal levels confused shoppers and resulted in
worse plan choice.25 Interventions such as smart defaults (which
present preselected plan options based on an individual’s health care
use) can substantially improve consumers’ abilities to enroll in costeffective plans, though these defaults dampen the degree of “choice”
involved.23
In one experiment, Colorado marketplace enrollees received one
of two messages that highlighted potential savings from switching
plans: a generic message that indicated the possibility of savings, or
a personalized message with specific premium savings information.
Though both nudges increased consumer shopping by 23 percent,
few consumers actually switched plans.26

As the panel discussed, much of the resistance
towards a single-payer plan may stem from
Americans’ distrust of the government to make
health insurance choices for us and design a
high-quality plan that is effective for everyone.

CHOICE, AUTONOMY, AND TRUST
Some panelists suggested that our desire for health insurance choice
is not actually about choice, but autonomy. This implies that our
concerns about choice may vary by the level of trust we place in other
agents or stakeholders (such as the government, our employer, or
the market) to structure our health insurance options. As the panel
discussed, much of the resistance towards a single-payer plan may
stem from Americans’ distrust of the government to make health
insurance choices for us and design a high-quality plan that is effective
for everyone. Transparency and oversight play a key role in whether
we trust another actor to make choices on our behalf and whether we
value the choices they present to us. Concerns about autonomy and
trust ultimately make it difficult to limit or eliminate people’s health
insurance options.

CONCLUSION
Implications for Health Care Reform
Given the mixed evidence around the value of health insurance
choice, what role should it play in the next era of health care reform?
Here we offer a few insights for policymakers as they consider
different proposals.
• F
 urther enhancing choice should not be the primary goal
of health care reform. When it comes to health plan choice,
consumers have a lot of options, but having choices does not
seem to make people better off. Moreover, offering more health
plan choices does not necessarily mean that they also will be
more affordable.27 Health care reform should focus on improving
quality and affordability – the number one concern of health
care consumers – rather than maximizing choice.
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Health care reform should focus on improving
quality and affordability – the number
one concern of health care consumers
– rather than maximizing choice.

• T
 here is often a tradeoff between choice of health plan and
choice of provider. A single-payer system where all providers
are under the same plan would eliminate health plan choice,
but likely increase provider choice. In a system that preserves
our current multi-payer structure (such as a public option or
expanded Medicare eligibility), this dynamic is flipped: we may
have greater health plan choices, but more restricted provider
options in any one plan. When crafting a health care reform
proposal, policymakers will have to decide which type of “choice”
to prioritize.
• W
 e should make plan selection simpler. As we have seen
with the ACA and consumer shopping studies, some strategies
could help improve plan selection, including offering simplified
and standardized plan options, defaults, financial calculators,
and nudges.28 Whether policymakers pursue sweeping health
care reform, make incremental changes, or stick with the status
quo, policies should be designed to help people make easier
and better decisions in all health care contexts, including plan
selection.
• H
 aving fewer, well understood choices, may help preserve
autonomy. As our panelists suggested, our desire for options
may reflect our desire for autonomy. However, in a market where
health insurance options are confusing and expensive, having
more choices does not necessarily increase consumers’ sense
of autonomy. When crafting a health care reform proposal,
policymakers should consider whether offering a smaller set of
choices – if well understood by consumers – could preserve
consumers’ autonomy.
Heath insurance choice will undoubtedly play a role in the next era of
health care reform. However, it should not be considered an intrinsic
good, nor as a feature of only one type of reform. Policymakers will
be tasked with deciding whether reform should enhance or constrain
health insurance choice, and the tradeoffs associated with each
option. Where choice is constrained, decisionmakers – whether
policymakers, payers, providers, or consumers – must be explicit and
strive for transparency.
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